A Behavioral Theory of Electoral Structure

Till Weber & Mark Franklin

Imagine an alien visitor sent to Earth to observe three indigenous rituals of leadership selection: the US presidential election of November 2016, the UK general election of June 2017 and the German federal election of September 2017. Our visitor knows from alien intelligence that the first-mentioned country has just undergone a campaign with the most-hated pair of candidates for its top office since the beginning of mass polling; that the second country has just dissolved its highest decision-making body in the midst of the gravest national crisis most people alive have experienced; and that the third country, infamous for its genocidal racism, has just taken in the largest number of foreign refugees in its history.

Yet our visitor finds that the organizations entrusted with governing these three countries are the same ones as before, and not even the relative level of popular support shows much sign of transformation. Earthlings, our visitor concludes, highly value order and stability in their political life.

In a recent article we aim to assist alien intelligence with explaining the surprising robustness of party systems in human democracies. The short answer to our visitor’s conclusion is that at the time of leadership selection, electoral democracy is indeed quite orderly and stable. However, this is not naturally so. Human society harbors a great deal of complexity, as can be observed whenever the quest for executive office is not on people’s minds. Party systems and electoral institutions function to restore order right in time for important leadership contests.

More technically, we theorize patterns of electoral competition as the outcome of a struggle between entropy and structure. Forces of entropy entail idiosyncratic voting behavior guided by subjective evaluations, while forces of structure entail coordinated behavior emerging from objective aspects of party preference. Our model locates determinants of party preference on a continuum spanning subjective and objective concerns. Entropy is endemic but elections for nationwide executive office periodically prime objective concerns, reinstating structure in party systems. We demonstrate the cyclical pulse of national elections in a comparative analysis of pseudo-randomized survey data from the European Election Studies since 1989. We also show how feedback from differently-sized party systems consolidates different working equilibria.

After presenting our findings at the annual meeting of the Galactic Political Science Association, we received critical feedback from alien intelligence. Apparently our visitor had also observed the French elections of 2017, and this case didn’t seem to fit our theory at all.

Fortunately we were able to dispel the doubts. Our theory posits (and our empirical evidence shows) that the forces of structure appear in different guises in differently-sized party systems. While in fragmented systems cyclical structuring is clearly visible, in systems dominated by two parties the obvious focus on which of the two will control the executive is generally sufficient to maintain structure. French two-round presidential elections have traditionally ensured the same focus, and spillover from the presidential race has structured ensuing legislative elections as well. Electoral institutions play a role here as they deter entry by third-party candidates, a phenomenon that can be most cleanly observed in the US. In France, our alien visitor was lucky enough to catch a peculiarity of the electoral system in action: An Earthling named Macron won a place on the second-round ballot with as little as 24% of first-round support. From there on the focus on executive power reliably summoned the forces of structure to chase off the forces of entropy, giving the highflyer 66% of second-round votes with close to the same turnout. Spillover to the legislative arena, another unmistakable sign of structuring, then awarded the party of the new president an absolute majority in parliament.

Party systems do change; more striking for the outside observer, however, appears to be their puzzling robustness—their seeming ability to retain structure even under adverse circumstances, absorbing pressure toward disintegration by channeling it into confined fluctuations in relative party strengths. We believe that this is an important insight for anyone interested in contemporary electoral democracy, wherever they are from.


Political Behavior seeks a new editor(s)

The deadline for submissions is January 1, 2018

APSA Organized Section 32: Elections, Public Opinion, and Voting Behavior Invites Nominations and Applications for Editor of Political Behavior

Professor Michael Martinez, Chair of APSA Organized Section 32: Elections, Public Opinion, and Voting Behavior (EPOVB), has appointed a Search Committee to select a new Editor for the Section’s affiliated journal, Political Behavior. Published by Springer Science+Business Media, the journal receives approximately 400 manuscript submissions per year, publishes four issues per year, and has a five-year Impact Factor of 2.6.

The members of the Search Committee are:

  • Cindy Kam (Vanderbilt University), Chair
  • Richard Johnston (University of British Columbia)
  • Jan Leighley (American University)
  • Alex Pacek (Texas A&M University)
  • Dave Peterson (Iowa State University, ex officio)

The Search Committee invites nominations and applications for the Editorship of Political Behavior. The incoming Editor will succeed current Editor David Peterson, whose term will end on December 31, 2018. The new Editor will serve a renewable four-year term, from January 1, 2019 through December 31, 2022. The Search Committee welcomes both individual Editor and Editorial Team candidacies.

The Editor/Editorial Team will be expected to:

  • Sustain and build Political Behavior‘s current high stature as a preeminent publication outlet within political science
  • Ensure that Political Behavior be open to submissions from all areas within the study of political behavior and to innovative work that may span traditional disciplinary boundaries
  • Handle the review process and adjudicate publication decisions in a discerning, fair, timely, and equitable manner
  • Work within the available resources to maintain journal operations and the editorial office
  • Appoint and consult with the Editorial Board as needed, and convene a meeting of the Editorial Board during the annual APSA general meeting
  • Give a brief report on the “state of the journal” at the annual business meeting of the EPOVB section (held during the annual APSA general meeting)
  • Join and continue membership in the EPOVB Section of APSA

Nominations and applications for the Editorship of Political Behavior should be sent via e-mail to the Search Committee Chair, Cindy Kam (E-mail: cindy.d.kam@vanderbilt.edu).

A complete application for the Political Behavior Editorship should consist of a single .pdf containing the following four elements:

  1. Application Letter: The application letter should discuss aspects of the candidate’s professional and scholarly experiences that will enable the candidate to succeed in the position.
  2. Vita: A complete vita should be provided by each individual candidate or each individual member of a proposed editorial team.
  3. Support Plan: Candidates should outline their plan to support Political Behavior while it is housed at their institution(s). Candidates for the Editorship are expected to receive some support from their home institution for the editorial duties. This typically includes: (1) a partial release from teaching responsibilities; (2) a graduate research assistant; and (3) summer support for the graduate student. Additional support, in the form of an online editorial management system and a yearly stipend for the editor, is provided by the publisher.
  4. Management Plan: The application should include a formal statement laying out plans for managing Political Behavior. Candidates should address the issues they believe to be relevant to the intellectual content and/or management of the journal. An effective management plan might engage questions such as:

(a) Would you initiate any new editorial policies, modify old policies, or redirect emphasis on distinctive features of the journal? In what directions do you wish to take the journal? How would you ensure attention to the diverse areas of interest within the subfield of political behavior?

(b) If you are proposing an Editorial team, what would be the division of labor among the individuals that comprise the team? How would the final editorial decisions be made on submitted manuscripts?

(c) What is your view of desk rejections? How will you select reviewers for manuscripts? How will you handle refusals and nonresponses from potential reviewers? How will you augment the reviewer pool?

(d) What strategies and procedures will you employ to encourage individuals to return high-quality reviews in a timely manner? How important do you believe turnaround time is, as an element of the review process?

(e) What policies for data accessibility and research transparency will you have as editor?

(f) How will you plan to use social media to increase the visibility of the journal?

(g) At the end of your tenure as Editor, what benchmarks would you use to evaluate your performance during your term?

To ensure full consideration, applications must be submitted by January 1, 2018. The Committee will work closely with the publisher, Springer Science+Business Media, to make every effort to select the new Editor by May 1, 2018.


Ideology and Vote Choice in U.S. Mayoral Elections: Evidence from Facebook Surveys

Michael Sances

Are city elections about policy? While some may see the answer to this question as obvious, it turns out to be a rather tricky question to answer. Some urban politics scholars conclude city elections are apolitical, given voters have already “voted with their feet” by deciding where they wish to live; others argue urban elections are about conflicts between social groups. Yet it has been hard to answer this question definitively, given the difficulty of surveying local voters. At the same time, evidence is growing that city officials behave ideologically when they make policy decisions, and that city policies overall tend to reflect what voters say they want. These recent findings regarding city responsiveness, as well as advances in survey recruitment technology, prompt me to take a fresh look at the role of policy voting in city elections.
Using Facebook advertisements targeted to particular local audiences, I recruit samples of hundreds of voters during the 2015 mayoral elections in Memphis and Nashville, TN, as well as an additional sample of over 1,000 voters from smaller cities in Illinois. These data allow me to estimate the relationship between voter ideology and candidate choice, adjusting for other observable and unobservable determinants of voting. Across a variety of samples and estimation strategies, I find ideology has a strong influence on local vote choice.
First, in cross-sectional analyses, I find that ideology is a powerful predictor of vote choice in Memphis and Nashville, controlling for demographic characteristics such as race. This provides suggestive evidence that ideology matters; however, given I am working with observational data, alternative explanations are possible. Thus, to further disentangle ideology from other factors, I next conduct an analysis of voter learning in the Nashville mayoral election. Using a panel design where the same respondents are interviewed before and after the election, I show that voter knowledge of candidates’ ideological positions increases significantly over the course of the election campaign. Further, this learning causally impacts voters’ choices, with liberals (conservatives) who learn becoming more (less) likely to vote for the liberal candidate.
Of course, it may be that ideology operates differently in large cities, or in cities in Tennessee. To test the generalizability of these results, I field a survey experiment to voters in smaller Illinois cities, presenting them with hypothetical candidates for village and city mayors. As in the big-city studies, I find these small-city voters also weight ideology heavily in their voting decisions, more than any other factor.
These results show that electoral accountability for policy is indeed possible in both large and small U.S. cities, and offer an explanation for recent evidence of municipal responsiveness. Yet they also showcase the potential of using geotargeted online surveys to study local political behavior – a subject which scholars know surprisingly little about compared to national-level behavior. A recent count of election-related articles published in major journals over 20 years shows less than 1% focus on local elections. This is due in part to the relative difficulty of collecting original survey data from local contexts. By introducing a new, relatively low-cost method of collecting geographically targeted data, my article breaks down barriers that have long kept the study of local elections separate from research conducted at other levels of government.

From Respondents to Networks: Bridging Between Individuals, Discussants, and the Network in the Study of Political Discussion

Matthew T. Pietryka, Florida State University, mpietryka@fsu.edu

Jack Lyons Reilly, New College of Florida, jreilly@ncf.edu

Daniel M. Maliniak, College of William & Mary, dxmali@wm.edu

Patrick R. Miller, University of Kansas, patrick.miller@ku.edu

Robert Huckfeldt, University of California, Davis, rhuckfeldt@ucdavis.edu

Ronald B. Rapoport, College of William & Mary, rbrapo@wm.edu

Donald Trump’s victory in the 2016 U.S. Presidential election left many journalists scrambling to explain how he won—and why so few liberals saw it coming. Many outlets advanced a common explanation: we are all living in political bubbles. We are surrounded by people who look and think like us. Social media algorithms accentuate that similarity by highlighting posts we are likely to enjoy and concealing messages that might draw our ire. As a result, we only see our views expressed by people we respect and we encounter opposing views only when they are shared derisively by our friends.

The assumption underpinning this logic is that is that many of us are susceptible to influence by a wide range of associates extending well beyond our closest connections. Had liberals only interacted with more Trump supporters, the logic goes, they would have been less surprised in the outcome and, perhaps, less aggrieved. This assumption may hold in online social networks, but previous research provides little insight into whether we are influenced by individuals beyond our few closest friends and family. In our article in Political Behavior, we examine this assumption.

Most previous research has been unable to address this question because real-world social networks are so difficult to measure. Typically, scholars measure social networks using a survey battery, which asks respondents to describe the handful of people they talk to most frequently. To avoid exhausting respondents, the surveys rarely ask them to describe more than five associates. As a result, we have learned much about how these closest associates influence people’s political attitudes and behavior, but we know little about how these outcomes are shaped by their more casual acquaintances.

To overcome this problem, we invited all students at College of William & Mary to respond to a survey asking about their political views and asking them to name their closest friends at the school. By focusing on this small, closed community, we were able to explore the role of these immediate friends as well as second-order contacts—associates identified by their friends. Thus we are able to examine how the views expressed in the broader social network help us understand and predict students’ awareness of local issues and participation in politics.

We show that, indeed, the broader social network may act as a filter, insulating students from important campus issues. But it can also act as a megaphone, exposing individuals to issues they and their closest friends have not experienced firsthand. The network also seems to condition the potential influence of individual friends, magnifying some voices while muting others. And while we show that immediate friends have the strongest relationship with individual attitudes, less immediate associates adds further explanatory power to our models.

We hope our work provides insight for scholars pondering how political bubbles and social interaction contribute to individual votes and beliefs. Together, our results suggest that models of political attitudes and behavior will gain additional traction if they can focus not only on immediate relationships, but also the broader network. Scholars should consider not just who individuals are connected to, but how they are connected and where those connections are situated in broader social environments.


What Draws Politicians’ Attention? An Experimental Study of Issue Framing and its Effect on Individual Political Elites

Stefaan Walgrave, Julie Sevenans, Kirsten Van Camp & Peter Loewen

Political attention is scarce and consequential. Policy change only happens when political elites attend to the policy issue at hand. But, the number of problems vying for politicians’ attention is too large given the time they have to attend to these problems. Politicians lack the time, resources, staff, cognitive capacities and motivation to attend to all, or even many, problems. This turns the political game into a bottleneck of attention. Many societal signals simply do not get through, but are filtered out and ignored. Politicians are highly selective in the signals they attend to. This study investigates some features of societal signals and examines which features contribute to the underlying information being noticed by politicians.

Following ample research on the attention ordinary citizens spent to media signals, the study examines three features of an incoming signal that may increase the attention politicians give to the signal. We examine (1) whether the message deals with conflict, (2) whether it deals more specifically with political conflict, and (3) whether it refers to who is politically responsible for the problem in the first place. Do politicians react in the same way, and do they devote more attention to signals displaying these features?

By and large, the answer is ‘yes’. Just like ordinary citizens, politicians prioritize information that has certain features or that, technically put, is ‘framed’ in a certain way. We come to this conclusion by examining 410 national and regional politicians in three countries, Belgium, Canada and Israel. These countries were chosen because they are so different. Their electoral systems—how politicians are elected—differs strongly. This means that re-election, this is what politicians probably value most, depends on different things. For example, since Canadian politicians are elected in a district that only counts one representative, Canadian representatives have strong incentives to only look at their constituency and to ignore signals from the rest of the country. This is very different in Israel, for example, were politicians are elected in a nationwide district. Still, notwithstanding these strong system differences, we find almost identical attention devotion patterns in the three countries under study. This makes us conclude that the found framing effects are due to politicians being human and being politicians, they are not due to their operating under a certain electoral system.

More concretely, we confronted each politician that participated in our research with a number of so-called “story titles” that contained a short piece of information (e.g. about down-payment requirements for buying property). We told our politicians that this was a fictional title of an email they received and asked them how likely it was that they would read the full story. The self-reported likelihood that they would read the full story is our measure of the attention politicians devote to the signal. The story titles were manipulated and different versions of a similar story title were made, one containing conflict and the other consensus, one containing political conflict and the other non-political conflict, and one containing a political responsibility attribution and the other a non-political responsibility attribution.

Conflict draws more attention than consensus, the results show, but it mainly draws more attention by opposition politicians, less by government politicians. Political conflict, in contrast, draws more attention in general, but the effect is stronger for government party members than for opposition members. When a signal contains a reference to the political responsibility for a problem, finally, all politicians’ attention is drawn, from government and opposition, and in all countries. This makes a political responsibility frame the strongest of the three frames we investigated. It is a potent driver of political attention.

Pass the Buck If You Can: How Partisan Competition Triggers Attribution Bias in Multilevel Democracies

Guillem Rico and Robert Liñeira

In federations and other decentralized systems, subnational conditions may be seen as the responsibility of either regional governments or the national executive. Previous research has shown that the existence of multiple tiers of government blurs the lines of responsibility, making it more difficult for voters to assign credit or blame for policy performance (Anderson 2000; Powell and Whitten 1993; Whitten and Palmer 1999). However, the information and cognitive barriers posed by the vertical division of power is not the sole obstacle to the formation of accurate responsibility judgments. Attributions of responsibility may be further hampered by voters’ propensity to bring responsibility judgments in line with their group attachments.

In this article, we argue that the institutional dispersion of power not only makes it harder for citizens to know which institution is responsible for policy outcomes, but also facilitates individuals’ rationalization of blame attributions. The two processes have similar observable implications, but imply markedly different micro-mechanisms at work. In the former scenario, the unclear responsibility judgements are due to voters’ inability to attribute responsibility accurately in a complex institutional setting. In the latter scenario, the same complex institutional setting facilitates motivated rationalizations that allow citizens ‘‘pass the buck’’ and adjust their attributions of responsibility according to their identity group attachments; in particular, according to their partisan and territorial identifications.

Party and territorial identifications constitute powerful markers that allow voters to distinguish governments in ‘‘us versus them’’ terms. We advance the argument that group identifications towards parties and territories bias attributions of responsibility only when the regional government and the national government belong to different parties that represent a relevant ingroup-outgroup conflict. In outparty contexts, voters claim success for governments that represent their party and territorial attachments and blame opposite governments for policy failures.

We test this claim using data from one national survey experiment and five regionally representative surveys in Spain. This research design gives us leverage on several grounds. First, by combining the survey experiment with regional surveys greatly improves the external validity of our results. The use of regionally representative, face-to-face surveys allows us to obtain fine-grained, region-by-region descriptive evidence of differences in responsibility attributions when respondents in a real-world situation are not explicitly given an economic treatment. Second, the fact that the experimental and the observational studies are drawn at different points in time allows us to test if the same pattern of attribution bias emerges under very different political and economic contexts. Third, by focusing on subnational cases within a single country, we control for factors such as the regions’ government institutions or the characteristics of the national political system to a far greater extent than is possible in studies that compare units within different federations.

In our online experiment, we use a between-subjects, one-shot design where respondents are randomly assigned to one of three conditions with varying information about the recent evolution of the economic situation in the respondent’s region of residence. The dependent variable is the net regional attribution, that is, the difference between the level of responsibility attributed to the regional government and the level of responsibility attributed to the national government. For the observational study, we test the conditions that affect the net attribution of responsibility for the economy in five different regions that represent the different partisan contexts: inparty, non-nationalist outparty, and nationalist outparty governments.

We find partisan motivated reasoning in action. Our experiment reveals that the influence of partisanship on responsibility judgments varies consistently with both the partisan context and perceptions of the policy conditions: when offered the opportunity to counter-argue a valenced assessment of the regional economy, voters in out-party regions systematically adjust their responsibility judgments to reach a conclusion more in line with their group attachments. By contrast, the attributions of voters under inparty regional governments are not consistently affected by information about the economy. The evidence from out observational study further validates the key role of partisan conflict in activating directional motives.

We also find that territorial identities feelings of attachment may indeed bias attributions in a similar way than partisanship. However, the mere presence of alternative national identities does not appear to automatically translate into the adjustment of attributions in favor of a particular level of government. Rather, substantial rationalizations driven by territorial attachments only occur when regional governments are controlled by nationalist parties seeking to advance a distinct national identity and promote greater autonomy or even independence for the region. Under such circumstances, voters with strong feelings of regional (national) identification will tend to claim successes for the regional (national) government, holding constant their partisan allegiances.

Judging the “Vapid and Hollow Charade”: Citizen Evaluations and the Candor of U.S. Supreme Court Nominees

Philip G. Chen and Amanda C. Bryan

Despite the controversy surrounding the nomination of Neil Gorsuch, the Supreme Court’s newest Associate Justice, his confirmation hearings this Spring occurred with little fanfare or drama. Pundits and political commentators were much more interested in the institutional fight happening behind the scenes – would Senate Republicans remove the filibuster? However, we found the Gorsuch hearings notable for an entirely different reason: they were relatively devoid of substance. Indeed, Gorsuch was a master of employing the so-called “Ginsburg Rule” where nominees decline to comment on specific policy beliefs or jurisprudential philosophies because those issues might one day come before the Court.

While the decision to not answer hypothetical questions aimed at distilling a nominee’s ideological views is nicknamed after Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the tradition likely dates back much further than 1992. Criticism of it is also not new. The prevalence of the “Ginsburg Rule” led then-legal academic Elena Kagan to question the usefulness and validity of the hearings themselves. She now-famously wrote that nominees’ refusing to discuss their views has turned the confirmation hearings into little more than a “vapid and hallow charade”

There has been a small body of excellent work tracing how candid nominees are during the hearings, and what impact this has on the Senate’s vote on the nominee (see especially Farganis and Wedeking 2011; 2014). We are interested in a different question: given that confirmation hearings are often the public’s first exposure to Supreme Court nominees, our article asks (and we think answers) the question of how a nominee’s lack of candor affects how the public forms opinions about that nominee.

In short, we argue a person’s opinions on a Supreme Court nominee are, on one level, merely an example of a political attitude. As such, the biggest factor in whether you support or oppose the nominee is your partisanship and whether your political leanings align with the nominating president. That said, literature from judicial politics suggest that people want something else from their nominees: they want them to appear above the political fray (Gibson and Caldeira 2009; Gibson 2010; Kelly 2010).

We argue that following the “Ginsburg Rule” does just that, making a nominee appear more trustworthy and limiting potential ideological conflicts. Thus, while partisanship should be (and is) the primary driver of evaluations of a nominee, a nominee can bolster support from respondents of the other political party by refusing to answer questions on their views.

We conduct two tests of this expectation. First, using a survey experiment, we recruited around 700 participants from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk and then asked them to learn about a hypothetical nominee. Respondents were randomly assigned to learn about a nominee who shared their political beliefs, or a nominee from the opposite political persuasion. We also manipulated whether the participant read about a nominee who was fully forthcoming about their beliefs on a salient political issue during the hearings or refused to answer the question for ethical reasons.

Our survey results gave strong support for our expectation. People in the pro-attitudinal condition, who we expected to support the nominee for ideological reasons, were unaffected by whether the nominee openly expressed their beliefs during the hearings. However, people asked to evaluate a counter-attitudinal nominee demonstrated much higher levels of support when their nominee was reticent to discuss their beliefs during the hearings.

As a secondary analysis we turned to an observational test. For their book, Farganis and Wedeking (2014) coded every answer nominees in the modern era gave to ideological questions, producing a score for each nominee on how candid their responses were. We compared that “forthcomingness score” to state-level partisanship data and a state-level measure of nominee support constructed by Kastellec, Lax and Phillips (2010). Here, too, we find that nominees who openly discuss their positions are “punished” by citizens, especially citizens who disagree with them. But nominees who were less candid saw higher levels of support, especially in ideologically unfriendly states.

Reticence, therefore, is strategically important for Supreme Court nominees who wish to obtain broad public support. Even in light of polls that show American’s may prefer nominees to be forthright during the confirmation hearings, what the people say they want and what is in the best interest of the nominee are at odds. Forthcoming nominees polarize the electorate by providing additional ideological information to their detractors, which in turn produces diminished support for the nominee. For a nominee who wishes to win over the general public, reticence rules.